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Abstract
The design of the income transfer program for the lower incomes is a hot issue in
current public policy debate. Should we stick to a generous welfare state with a
sizeable basic income, but high marginal tax rates for the lower incomes and thus
little incentives to work? Or, should we “make work pay” by subsidizing the work of
low earners, but possibly at the cost of a smaller safety net? We think it is difficult
to answer this question without making clear what individuals are (held) responsible
for and what not. First, we present a new fair allocation, coined a Pareto Efficient
and Shared resources Equivalent allocation (PESE), which compensates for different
productive skills, but not for different tastes for working. We also characterize a fair
social ordering, which rationalizes the PESE allocation. Second, we illustrate the
optimal second-best allocation in a discrete Stiglitz (1982, 1987) economy. The
question whether we should have regressive or progressive taxes for the low earners
crucially depends on whether the low-skilled have a strictly positive or zero skill.
Third, we simulate fair taxes for a sample of Belgian singles. Our simulation results
suggest that “making work pay” policies can be optimal, according to our fairness
criterion, but only in the unreasonable case in which most of the unemployed are
not willing to work.
1 Motivation
Focussing on the tax-benefit system as a whole, many European countries combine a
sizeable basic income with high marginal taxes for the low income earners. These pro-
grams are praised for their redistributional appeal, directing the largest possible transfer
towards the poorest in society. But, at the same time, critics have held these schemes
responsible for large unemployment traps, because they do not provide incentives to
(start) work(ing). Therefore, some continental European countries –such as Belgium,
Finland, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands– have proposed and/or intro-
duced tax credit schemes recently, to subsidize the low income earners; see Bernardi
and Profeta (2004) for an overview. At the same time, the US and the UK, with a
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much longer tradition in tax credit schemes, have reinforced the role of their tax cred-
its. The increased policy interest for such “making work pay” schemes is its ability to
tackle two problems at the same time. It has a positive effect on employment (the
number of people working and, to a lesser extent, the aggregate labour hours), while
it increases the income of poor households; see Pearson and Scarpetta (2000) for an
overview.
While “making work pay” schemes may attain desirable objectives, it is not clear
whether it is also optimal to “make work pay” for a given budget constraint. The
“welfarist” optimal income tax literature consists of three canonical models, depend-
ing on whether labour supply responses are modelled intensively and/or extensively
(Heckman, 1993). First, in a Mirrlees (1971) economy, individuals respond via the in-
tensive margin, i.e., by varying their labour hours or effort. Marginal taxes should be
non-negative everywhere (Mirrlees, 1971), which excludes the possibility of subsidizing
work. At the bottom, the marginal tax has to be zero, but only in case everybody works
(Seade, 1977). Once there exists an atom of non-workers, the marginal tax rate has
to be positive (Ebert, 1992) and, according to some numerical simulations (Tuomala,
1990), rather high. Using the empirical earnings distribution, high and decreasing mar-
ginal taxes at the bottom seem to survive (Diamond, 1998, Kanbur and Tuomala, 1994,
Piketty, 1997 and Saez, 2001). To conclude, in a Mirrlees economy, high marginal tax
rates at the bottom seem optimal. Second, in Diamond’s (1980) approach, individuals
respond via the extensive margin, i.e., they choose to work or not. Marginal tax rates
can be negative, suggesting at least the possibility of subsidizing the work of low earn-
ers. Third, Saez (2002) presents a unifying framework where individuals can respond via
both margins. Support for one of both income transfer schemes depends on the relative
importance of both response margins and on the redistributive tastes of government.
Saez’ benchmark simulation suggests a sizeable basic income (around $7300/year), but,
combined with a tax exemption at the bottom (for incomes up to $5000/year).
In the same year of Mirrlees’ (1971) seminal contribution, Rawls (1971) criticizes the
welfarist approach. In the aftermath of Rawls’ influential work, many alternative theo-
ries of distributive justice were proposed. Although very diverse in equalisandum, they
almost all have Dworkin’s (1981) cut in common. Dworkin claims that not all individual
characteristics can (should) be considered as morally arbitrary. Therefore one has to
make a clear cut between endowments and ambitions. He introduces personal respon-
sibility: individuals are responsible for their ambitions –as long as they identify with
them– but not for their endowments. As a consequence, a fair distribution scheme
should be ambition-sensitive, but endowment-insensitive.
In an optimal income tax setting, fairness could require to compensate for differences
in productive skill (endowment), but not for differences in taste for working (ambition).
Schokkaert et al. (2004) introduce such fairness considerations in different ways and
calculate the corresponding optimal linear income tax, which turns out to be positive.1
Allowing for non-linear tax schemes, results change drastically. Boadway et al. (2002)
analyze the optimal non-linear income tax according to a weighted utilitarian or max-
imin social planner where different weights are chosen for different tastes. Fleurbaey and
Maniquet (2002) characterize a fair social ordering to analyze non-linear income taxes.
In both studies, negative marginal taxes (for the low income earners) may be optimal.
1Roemer et al. (2001) consider the education level of the parents as the compensating variable.
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In the next section we present a new fair allocation, coined a Pareto Efficient and Shared
resources Equivalent (PESE) allocation. As the name suggests, the optimal allocation is
Pareto efficient and all individuals are indifferent between their bundle and what they
would get if it were physically possible to divide or share all resources, including the
productive skills. Section 3 characterizes a fair social ordering, which rationalizes the
PESE allocation. In section 4, we introduce a “discrete” Stiglitz (1982, 1987) economy
with (i) four types of individuals (defined by a low or high productive skill and a low
or high taste for working) and (ii) a government who wants to install fair taxes, but
cannot observe individuals’ type. We show that fairness recommends regressive taxation
for the low earners, as long as the low-skilled individuals have a strictly positive skill. In
case the low-skilled have a zero skill, only progressive taxes can be optimal. In section
5, we simulate fair taxes for Belgian singles, while carefully paying attention to the
calibration of the compensation (hourly wages) and responsibility (taste for working)
variable. Our simulation results suggest that “making work pay” policies can be optimal
–according to our fairness criterion– but only in the unreasonable case in which most
of the unemployed are not willing to work.
2 Equality of resources revisited
When all resources in society are alienable and divisible, Dworkin proposes to divide re-
sources equally (endowment insensitivity), followed by an auction to reallocate resources
according to taste (ambition sensitivity). This leads to a Pareto efficient and envy-free
allocation. To study fair income taxation, however, we have to introduce productive re-
sources (skills), which are not alienable, and therefore a problem arises. In production
economies, Pareto efficient and envy-free allocations do not exist, in general.
A first class of solutions tries to extend the above Dworkinian auction by assigning
property rights over leisure. Varian (1974) analyzes two, rather extreme, solutions. One
may divide consumption goods equally and either (i) assign each individual his own
leisure, or (ii) give each individual an equal share in each of the agents’ (including his
own) leisure time. After trade, the resulting competitive (and hence Pareto efficient)
equilibria are called respectively (i) wealth-fair and (ii) income-fair. In the wealth-fair
allocation, productive talents are a private good and the resulting allocation does not
compensate at all for inabilities. In the income-fair allocation, productive talents are
a public good. The high-skilled has to buy back his expensive leisure and is therefore
punished for being a high skill type, resulting in a slavery of the talented. Intermediate
solutions exist where skills are neither purely private, nor purely public (Fleurbaey and
Maniquet, 1996, Maniquet, 1998).
A second class of solutions starts from the concept of fair-equivalence. Pazner and
Schmeidler (1978) define an allocation to be fair-equivalent if everyone is indifferent
between his bundle in this allocation and the bundle he would receive in a “hypo-
thetical” fair, i.e., envy-free, allocation. It then suffices to define an interesting “hypo-
thetical” fair allocation and to look whether there exist Pareto efficient ones, among
all fair-equivalent allocations. The resulting allocation is called a Pareto efficient and
fair-equivalent (PEFE) allocation.
Pazner and Schmeidler (1978) propose an egalitarian allocation –an allocation where
everybody consumes the same consumption-leisure bundle– as the fair one, which leads
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to Pareto efficient and egalitarian-equivalent (PEEE) allocations. We propose a differ-
ent fair allocation, which we coin a “shared resources” allocation. This is the allocation
which would result, if it were (physically) possible to divide or share all resources, includ-
ing the productive ones. To make this idea more precise, we introduce some notation.
A fixed number of individuals, denoted i ∈ N = {1, . . . , n}, differ in skills and prefer-
ences. Skill s ∈ R+ defines production (called gross income in the sequel) in a linear
way, or y = sc, with c ∈ [0, 1] the amount of labour. We denote a skill profile by
s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Rn+. Taste for working is represented by a continuously differentiable
utility function
U : R× [0, 1]→ R : (c, c) :→ U (c, c) ,
which is strictly increasing (resp. strictly decreasing) in consumption c (resp. labour
c) and strictly quasi-concave. We call U the corresponding set of utility functions and,
normalizing the consumption price equal to one, we refer to c as the net income in the
sequel. A utility profile is denoted by U = (U1, . . . , Un) ∈ Un. An economy e = (s,U)
is completely defined by a skill and a utility profile; all economies are gathered in a set
E = Rn+ × Un.
Individuals are (held) responsible for their tastes, but not for their skills. Therefore, we
want to compensate individuals for different outcomes which are only due to different
skills, but not for different outcomes which are only caused by different tastes for work-
ing. In case skills are alienable –think, e.g., of individuals as farmers who receive, as
a matter of brute bad luck, either a blunt or a whetted scythe (the skill s) to harvest
crops (the consumption c)– there is a particularly simple and attractive way to obtain
a fair allocation:
(a). each individual pays (or receives) the same lump-sum amount of money,
(b). each individual can use each skill (including his own) for a time equal to
1
n at most.
As such, all individuals would end up with the same opportunity set. In the sequel, we
call this opportunity set the “shared resources” opportunity set and the resulting alloca-
tion (which ultimately depend on the tastes in society) is called the “shared resources”
allocation.
To illustrate these concepts, suppose (i) there are only two skill types possible in society,
say low (L) and high (H), which are equally represented in the skill pool s, and (ii) there
are only two tastes for working possible, also called low (L) and high (H). An allocation
z = (zLL, zLH , zHL, zHH) contains one bundle zst = (cst, cst) for each of the four types
st, with s referring to the skill (low or high) and t referring to the taste (low or high).
Figure 1 illustrates the opportunity sets and (resulting) allocations in case (a) each
individual receives the same lump-sum amount of money a, but productive resources
are not shared, and (a)+(b) each individuals receives the same lump-sum amount a
and also the productive resources are shared (each individual can work with each of the
skills half-time at most).
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Figure 1: Opportunity set/allocation change when sharing productive resources.
Sharing productive resources is not technically feasible in many cases. Labour market
productivities, due to inborn characteristics such as intelligence, talents, handicaps and
so on, are typically inalienable. Still, we could consider the allocation, which would
arise if it were possible to divide and share all resources equally, as an interesting
“hypothetical” case. However, the resulting hypothetical “shared resources” allocation
is not Pareto efficient, in general. Therefore, we propose to focus on Pareto Efficient and
Shared resources Equivalent (PESE) allocations. Figure 2 illustrates a PESE allocation
for an economy defined by the same assumptions (i) and (ii) as in figure 1. Due to Pareto
efficiency, the slope of an individual’s indifference curve must be equal to his skill level
in his bundle. Given the skill and preference technology, there exists a unique PESE
allocation for each value of a.
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Figure 2: A Pareto efficient and shared resources equivalent allocation.
3 A “shared resources” social ordering
In case it is possible to recognize the less from the more productive and the lazy from
the hard-working individuals, we can choose among all Pareto efficient and “shared
resources” equivalent allocations described in the previous section. However, it is not
always possible to observe types. To proceed in such a second-best setting, it is more
convenient to characterize a corresponding “shared resources” social ordering.
We define our well-being concept, which is closely linked to the PESE allocation. Let
Z = (R× [0, 1])n be the set of allocations z = (zi)i∈N , containing one bundle zi = (ci, ci)
for each individual i in N . We get (an explanation follows):
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????-?????: For each allocation z ∈ Z, the vector of well-being levels w =
(wi)i∈N ∈ Rn is defined by the amounts of money wi which would make individual
i indifferent between (i) receiving (or paying) this amount of money wi and sharing
all productive resources equally (in time), and (ii) his actual bundle xi. Because
the well-being vector w depends on the allocation z and the economy e = (s,U),
we write w =W (z, e), with wi =Wi (z, e).
A few observations need to be stressed here. First, for the PESE allocation presented in
figure 2, the well-being levels are the same for all individuals and equal to a. More gen-
eral, in any “shared resources” equivalent allocation, individuals end up with the same
well-being and, vice versa, if all individuals have the same well-being in an allocation,
the latter must be “shared resources” equivalent. Second, well-being has to be inter-
preted as a “relative” measure of fair treatment, in the spirit of the PESE allocation. If
two individuals have the same well-being, they have been treated equally fair, because
both individuals are indifferent between their actual bundle and the bundle they would
choose if (a) they receive the same lump-sum amount of money and (b) all productive
resources are shared equally. If one individual has a strictly lower well-being compared
to another, he has been treated unfair with respect to the other, because both individ-
uals are indifferent between their actual bundle and the bundle they would choose if
(b) all productive resources are shared equally, but (a) the former individual receives
a strictly lower lump-sum amount of money. Third, higher utility (and thus a higher
indifference curve) also leads to a higher well-being level. As such, our definition of well-
being corresponds with one specific, but, according to us, interesting cardinalization of
the utility functions.
A rule f maps economies into orderings, or f : E → R : e :→ Re = f (e), with R the
set of all orderings (complete and transitive binary relations) defined over allocations z
in Z; call Pe and Ie the corresponding asymmetric and symmetric relation. We define
some properties for f . Our Pareto principle is equal to Pareto Indifference and the Weak
Pareto principle together, i.e., if everyone is indifferent between allocations z and z

,
then z should also be socially indifferent to z

and if everyone strictly prefers allocation
z to z

, then z should also be socially strictly preferred to z

. Anonimity requires that
the names of the individuals do not matter. Formally:
P?????: For each economy e ∈ E and for all allocations z, z ∈ Z: If Ui (zi) =
Ui
?
z

i
?
for all i ∈ N , then zIez

. If, Ui (zi) > Ui
?
z

i
?
for all i ∈ N , then zPez

.
A????????: For each economy e ∈ E , for each allocation z ∈ Z and for each
permutation π : N → N over individuals: If Ui = Uj for all i, j ∈ N , then zIeπ (z),
with π (z) =
?
zπ(1), . . . , zπ(n)
?
.
In line with the idea to compensate for differences in outcomes which are only due
to differences in skills, compensation (Fleurbaey and Maniquet, 2002) requires that a
Pigou-Dalton transfer (in terms of net income) from a rich to a poor individual with
the same preferences and the same labour should be welfare improving:
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C???????????: For each economy e ∈ E , for all allocations z, z ∈ Z and for all
individuals i, j ∈ N : If (i) ci = cj , c

i = c

j and Ui = Uj , (ii) ∃δ > 0 such that
c

i = ci + δ < cj − δ = c

j and (iii) zk = z

k for all k 9= i, j, then zRz

.
Finally, in line with (i) our well-being definition and (ii) the idea that individuals are
responsible for their tastes, Well-being Independence requires the ranking of two allo-
cations to be the same (i) whenever they give rise to the same well-being vector, (ii)
irrespective of the utility profile:
W???-????? I???????????: For all economies e = (s,U) , e =
?
s,U

?
∈ E and
for all allocations z, z
 ∈ Z: IfW (z, e) =W
?
z, e

?
andW
?
z

, e
?
=W
?
z

, e

?
,
then zRez
 ⇔ zRez

.
Given these axioms, we should focus on the minimal well-being in society, or:2
Proposition 1. If a rule f : E → R satisfies Pareto, Anonimity, Compensation and
Well-being Independence, then, for each economy e ∈ E and for all allocations z, z ∈ Z:
minW (z, e) > minW
?
z

, e
?
implies zPez

.
The “shared resources” social ordering has some formal similarity with Fleurbaey and
Maniquet’s (2000) ?s-implicit budget leximin function, where ?s is a reference skill level.
In our case, the reference skill ?s is piece-wise linear and endogenously defined by the
skill pool in society. As such, laissez-faire allocations are selected in case all individuals
have the same skill.
4 Fair taxes: theory
In the previous section, we characterize a fair social ordering, inspired by the PESE
allocation. In this section, we analyze what happens when the government uses this fair
social ordering to calculate optimal taxes in a discrete Stiglitz economy (1982, 1987)
with four types, which are not observable to the government.
All individuals in N = {1, . . . , n} can have four types, denoted (s, t) ∈ S × T , where
s is the skill level and t the taste for working; we abbreviate types as st ∈ ST . Each
type st is represented by nst > 0 individuals, with n =
?
st∈ST nst. Skills can be low or
high, or s ∈ S = {L,H}, with 0 < L < H; later on, we come back to the issue of zero
skills. Tastes for working can also be low or high, or t ∈ {L,H}, which correspond with
a utility function Ut.3
As before, utility functions belong to U , but we impose some additional properties.
Let Vst represent the preferences in the consumption-income space for type st, more
precisely Vst : R× [0, s]→ R : (c, y) :→ Vst (c, y) ≡ Ut
?
c, ys
?
.4 We impose two additional
2All proofs can be found in appendix A.
3The exact scalars do not matter here, so we stick to the notation of L to denote low taste for working
and/or low-skilled and H > L to denote high taste for working and/or high-skilled.
4Whenever s = 0, we define Vst (c, y) = c for all (c, y) ∈ R× {0}.
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properties on the utility functions Ut; see Stiglitz (1982, 1987) for the first and Boadway
et al. (2002) for the second property:
S?????-????????????: A higher taste for working t corresponds with a lower
marginal rate of substitution (denoted MRSt = −∂Ut/∂∂Ut/∂c), expressing the view
that individuals with a higher taste for working require less compensation (in
terms of net income c) to work a little bit longer. Formally: MRSL > MRSH in
R× [0, 1].
I???????????????? ?????? ????: The types LH and HL have the same pref-
erences in the consumption-income space. Formally, there exists a continuous and
strictly increasing function φ : R→ R, such that VLH = φ ◦ VHL in R× [0, L].
Both assumptions together, the marginal rates of substitution in consumption-income
space (denoted MRSYst = −∂Vst/∂y∂Vst/∂c ) are also single-crossing, more precisely:
MRSYLL > MRSYLH =MRSYHL > MRSYHH , in R× [0, L] and
MRSYHL > MRSYHH in R× [L,H].
We focus in the sequel on allocations x = (xLL, xLH , xHL, xHH) in consumption-income
space, thus x ∈ X = (R× [0, L])2 × (R× [0,H])2, containing one bundle xst = (cst, yst)
for each type st ∈ ST . The program of the government is to find the best allocation(s)
x –“best” according to the fair social ordering defined in proposition 1– subject to
(i) incentive compatibility constraints (no type envies another type’s bundle) and (ii)
a feasibility constraint (the sum of all taxes is larger than the government requirement
g ∈ R). Recall our definition of well-being in the previous section; with a slight abuse
of notation, we write the well-being of type st in allocation x as wst =Wst (x). We get:
???
x∈X
???
st∈ST
(Wst (x))st∈ST subject to (∗)
????????? ????????????? ??????????? IC
st,(st)
 :
Vst (xst) ≥ Vst
?
x
(st)

?
,∀st ∈ {H} × T,∀ (st) ∈ ST,
Vst (xst) ≥ Vst
?
x
(st)

?
,∀st ∈ {L} × T,∀ (st) ∈ ST with y
(st)
 ≤ L.
??????????? ??????????: ?
st∈ST
nst (yst − cst) ≥ g.
Our first result tells us that the lowest income type, the “undeserving poor” with type
LL, must always receive less subsidies (or pay higher taxes) than the second lowest
income type, the “hard-working poor” with type LH. This result suggests that it is
optimal –according to our fair social ordering– to “make work pay” by subsidizing
the low earners:
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Proposition 2 . Consider a four type economy with skills 0 < L < H and tastes
represented by utility functions UL, UH ∈ U , which satisfy single-crossingness and in-
distinguishable middle type. Consider a government who optimizes the program defined
by ( ∗). In an optimal allocation x∗ ∈ X we must have y∗LL − c∗LL ≥ y∗LH − c∗LH .
We have to put this result in perspective, however. Although it is reasonable to assume
that all individuals (with a capacity for work) have strictly positive productive skills,
individuals might be constrained in their choice due to labour market frictions. Minimum
wage laws, rationing and so on, may prevent individuals, in particular the low-skilled,
from working. Suppose, in our four type economy, that the low-skilled individuals, are
willing, but cannot work, due to such constraints, which are beyond their responsibility.
In such a case, their skills are nullified. This turns proposition 2 round, or, taxes must
be progressive for the bottom incomes:
Proposition 3. Consider a four type economy with skills L = 0 < H and tastes repre-
sented by utility functions UL, UH ∈ U, which satisfy single-crossingness and indistin-
guishable middle type. Consider a government who optimizes the program defined by ( ∗).
In an optimal allocation x∗ ∈ X we must have y∗LL − c∗LL = y∗LH − c∗LH ≤ y∗HL − c∗HL.
Both proposition 2 and 3 are based on simple fictitious economies. Furthermore, in
proposition 3 we consider a rather extreme case in which all unemployed (the low-
skilled) are not able to work. In the next section, we simulate fair taxes for a sample of
Belgian singles. It allows us to focus on (i) more realistic economies with many different
types and, more importantly, on (ii) different and more realistic scenarios concerning
the ability of the unemployed to work. The different scenarios in (ii) have a crucial
impact on the tax-benefit scheme for the low earners.
5 Fair taxes: simulation results
5.1 Calibration
We use a sample of singles from the 1997 wave of the Panel Study for Belgian House-
holds; we only include singles with a capacity for work (students, pensioners, sick, or
handicapped singles are excluded). We observe (i) the pre-tax yearly labour income y,
(ii) the amount of labour c, normalized such that 0 ≤ c ≤ 1, where c = 1 corresponds
with 2925 hours, i.e., 45 weeks times 65 hours, (iii) the gross hourly wage rate σ (only
observed for those who worked, i.e., both y, c 9= 0) which leads to a gross yearly wage
rate s = 2925σ and (iv) the total net unemployment benefit β (only observed for those
who were partly or completely unemployed in 1997) from which we derive the net yearly
unemployment benefit b = β1− , i.e., the net unemployment benefit one would obtain if
full-time unemployed (c = 0).
First, we consider all individuals for which we possess all of the above information. We
consider quasi-linear preferences (which exclude income effects) represented by utility
functions:5
Ut : R× [0, 1]→ R : (c, c) :→ Ut (c, c) = c− 1
t
ε
1 + ε
c
1+ε
ε ,
5Due to quasi-linearity, other non-labour income (e.g., due to rents, gifts, alimony, child allowances)
does not matter for the labour choice of an individual. Furthermore, we assume that non-labour income
falls within the responsiblity of an individual and it is therefore excluded from our analysis.
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with t the taste parameter (possibly different for different individuals) and ε the labour
supply elasticity (the same for all individuals). Preferences in consumption-income space
become:
Vst : R× [0, s]→ R : (c, y) :→ Vst (c, y) = c− 1
s
1+ε
ε t
ε
1 + ε
y
1+ε
ε .
The net income of a Belgian single equals y − τ97(y) + b(1− ys ), with τ97(·) the actual
tax system for singles in Belgium in 1997 (reported in appendix B) and b(1 − ys ) the
benefit when working c = ys units of time. Both tax and benefit parts separately, as
well as the resulting budget set (the solid line), are illustrated in figure 3.
?
?
c
0 s y
??
??
??
??
??
??
tax
tax + benefit
?? ???????
b
benefit
??
???
???
???
t
h ?
?
y
Figure 3: Calibration of the taste parameter t.
We calibrate t such that the choice of y is rationalized for each single. More precisely,
the slope of the individual’s budget set at y, denoted h (y), should be equal to the
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and gross income for the quasi-linear
preferences Vst; we get6
t =
1
s
1
h (y)
?y
s
? 1
ε
, with h (y) = 1− τ 97(y)−
b
s
.
Second, since we could only observe gross yearly wages s (resp. net yearly unemployment
benefits b) for individuals who worked in 1997 (resp. individuals who received unem-
ployment benefits in 1997), we complete our dataset by imputing values for s and b,
whenever unobserved, via a Heckman selection model. Thus, in estimating s and b, we
correct for a possible sample selection bias, due to the fact that we only observe wages
s for those who worked and benefits b for those who were (permanently or temporarily)
unemployed. The variables used for the imputation as well as the estimation results are
described in appendix C.
We end up with a heterogeneous sample of 621 singles who differ in skills s and tastes t,
which drive their labour market behaviour; appendix D contains some descriptive statis-
tics for our dataset. Two points are worth mentioning here. First, the non-responsibility
parameter s and the responsibility parameter t in our dataset are barely correlated:
using a low labour supply elasticity ε = 0.1 for singles, the correlation between s and
6Requiring t > 0, individuals with h ≤ 0 were dropped out of the sample (17 observations).
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t equals −0.071, suggesting independently distributed skills and tastes. With a strong
correlation, compensating for skills only (and not for tastes) would be a dubious exer-
cise. Second, given the nature of our quasi-linear preferences, all unemployed individuals
receive a taste for working t = 0. To put it differently, all unemployed are considered
unwilling to work. We relax this crucial assumption later on.
5.2 Results
Rather than using allocations as in the government program (∗), we use a piece-wise
linear tax-benefit scheme as our instrument to approximate a non-linear tax scheme.
As we are mainly concerned with the bottom incomes, we consider a piecewise linear
tax-benefit scheme up to yearly gross earnings of 20000 in steps of 500 and we use
a constant marginal tax rate afterwards. Using either a wider range of piecewise linear
taxes (up to 80000 in steps of 500) or a finer grid (up to 20000 in steps of 250)
does not change our results for the bottom incomes drastically. Remarkably, using
a wider range leads to approximately constant marginal tax rates for incomes above
20000, with the exception of the very high incomes. Given such a tax-benefit scheme,
individuals choose their best bundle (according to their tastes and skills) and, therefore,
incentive constraints are not necessary anymore. For the feasibility constraint, we use
the total government requirement (g) in the actual system, which is (in per capita terms)
equal to 3851.
5.2.1 The benchmark simulation
No income effects and a low labour supply elasticity do not seem unrealistic for singles;
see, e.g., Blundell and MaCurdy (1999) for an empirical assessment. Using a labour
supply elasticity ε = 0.1 as a benchmark (BM), figure 4 depicts the chosen bundles in
the consumption-gross income space; the dotted line does not represent an optimal tax-
benefit schedule, but is only connecting the chosen consumption-gross income bundles.
We also report (i) how the benchmark allocation changes when adding participation
constraints (BM+PC), i.e., everyone prefers his bundle rather than not participating
and receiving the bundle (0, 0), and (ii) the Rawlsian optimal allocation, i.e., the one
which maximizes the basic income (RAWLS). Our benchmark simulation (BM) is rather
extreme, with a negative (yearly) basic income of —16067, very strong subsidies as soon
as individuals start working (up to gross incomes equal to 3000), a progressive part
for gross incomes between 3000 and 9500, a small regressive part again for incomes
between 9500 and 11500 and progressive taxes afterwards. Adding participation
constraints (BM+PC), we obtain a low (yearly) basic income equal to 518, moderate
subsidies fading in around 3000 and fading out around 11500, followed by progressive
taxes. The Rawlsian case installs a positive basic income equal to 9363 and high
positive marginal tax rates for the bottom incomes.
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Figure 4: Optimal allocation for the benchmark and the Rawlsian case.
Table 1 summarizes for all schemes and for different groups of individuals G (i) the
proportion of individuals |G|n and (ii) the average tax rate (
1
|G|
?
i∈G (yi − ci)).
G y = 0 0 < y ≤ 10000 10000 < y ≤ 20000 20000 < y
proportion 0.19 0.09 0.36 0.36
BM
avg. tax 16067 −3951 −3765 6955
proportion 0.19 0.11 0.41 0.29
BM+PC
avg. tax −518 −1321 561 13104
proportion 0.21 0.14 0.40 0.25
RAWLS
avg. tax −9363 −4206 5849 15856
Table 1: Some characteristics for the benchmark and the Rawlsian case.
5.2.2 The impact of ε
In our benchmark simulation, the labour supply elasticity ε equals 0.1. Using a lower
ε = 0.05, the correlation between s and t equals -0.049, while for a higher ε = 0.2,
the correlation between s and t becomes -0.075. Figure 5 shows the limited impact of
varying ε (0.05, 0.1, 0.2) on our optimal allocation. The sequence of regressive and
progressive parts turns out to be rather robust to the labour supply elasticity.
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Figure 5: Measuring the impact of varying ε.
5.2.3 What about choice constraints?
As far, individuals who do not work (y = 0) are all modelled as individuals who do not
want to work (t = 0). This is clearly an extreme viewpoint. For example, minimum wage
laws in Belgium could keep some individuals (especially those with low skills s) from
working and, therefore, our calibration might underestimate their true taste parameter
t, thus overestimating their well-being level w. More reasonably, at least some of the
observed unemployment must be involuntary, especially in the case of singles. We
consider two, rather conservative cases: unemployment is voluntary for the unemployed
with either the 90% highest (90%) or the 75% highest (75%) productivities. The results
change dramatically.
We proceed as follows. First, we assign (as a start value) to each constrained individual
a taste parameter t in the neighbourhood of the average taste parameter of the working
and minimize the overall correlation between skills and tastes by deviating from these
start values. Afterwards, we keep these individuals constrained at y = 0, but use their
“true” taste parameter to calculate well-being levels.7 Figure 6 presents the benchmark
case (BM) –which represents the extreme case where all unemployment is voluntary–
together with the 90%- and the 75%-case –where respectively 90% and 75% of the
unemployment is voluntary (for those with the higher productivities)– as well as the
Rawlsian (RAWLS) case, which maximizes the basic income.
7As we do not know whether it is technically possible to alleviate these constraints, we stick to tax
instruments to maximize the minimal well-being.
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Figure 6: Measuring the impact of constraints.
It clearly shows that taking choice constraints into account dramatically alters our fair
tax-benefit scheme. The 90%-case installs a basic income equal to 1631, but it is still
followed by a small regressive region (around 5000 - 10000), whereas the 75%-case
already leads to a progressive tax-benefit scheme with a basic income equal to 6931
and rather high marginal taxes for the bottom incomes.
6 Conclusion
Given the increased importance many governments attach to ”making work pay” poli-
cies, we examine whether subsidizing low earners is optimal according to a specific “fair”
social ordering. Fairness considerations are kept simple in this paper: we want to com-
pensate individuals for differences in productive skills, but we keep them responsible for
their tastes for working.
In a discrete Stiglitz (1982, 1987) economy with four types, optimal taxes crucially
depend on the low skill level. Taxes should always be regressive for the bottom incomes
–to improve the situation of the worst-off, the hard-working “deserving” poor– unless
the low-skilled have zero skills. Although it is reasonable to assume that all individuals
with a capacity for work have strictly positive skills, labour market frictions –such
as minimum wage laws and job rationing– may nullify their skills. As a consequence,
“making work pay” schemes are optimal, only if individuals are unconstrained when
making labour choices.
Our simulation results, calibrated on a sample of Belgian singles, illustrate the crucial
issue again: are individuals and, more specifically, the unemployed, truly responsible
for their labour choices? If all unemployment is voluntary, “making work pay” schemes
are optimal. However, this assumption is hardly plausible. If only a small number of
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unemployed have similar tastes for working as the employed, but cannot work due
to constraints (beyond their responsibility), the optimal tax-benefit scheme changes
drastically. More precisely, it moves quickly from a low basic income and high subsidies
for the bottom incomes towards a sizeable basic income combined with high marginal
taxes for the low earners. The crucial question –the percentage of the unemployed who
are willing, but unable to work– is ultimately an empirical issue. Meanwhile, since
conservative low estimates change our results rapidly towards a high basic income and
high marginal taxes for the bottom incomes, we believe that the latter, rather than
making work pay schemes, should be given the benefit of the doubt.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of proposition 1
If a rule f : E → R satisfies Pareto, Anonimity, Compensation and Well-being In-
dependence, then, for each e ∈ E and for all allocations z, z ∈ Z: minW (z, e) >
minW
?
z

, e
?
⇒ zPez

.
Proof.
First, we show, in three steps, that Pareto Indifference (the first part of the Pareto
axiom) and Well-being Independence for f are equivalent with Neutrality for f :
N?????????: For all economies e = (s,U), e =
?
s,U

?
∈ E and for all allocations
a,b, c,d ∈ Z: If W (a, e) =W
?
b, e

?
and W (c, e) =W
?
d, e

?
, then aRec ⇔
bRed.
1. If f satisfies Neutrality then f also satisfies Pareto Indifference. Suppose the an-
tecedent of Pareto Indifference is true for a certain economy e ∈ E and two alloca-
tions z, z
 ∈ Z, i.e., Ui (zi) = Ui
?
z

i
?
for all i ∈ N . As such, zi lies on the same
indifference curve as z

i for all individuals and, by definition of our well-being concept,
W (z, e) =W
?
z

, e
?
. Let e

= e and define allocations a = d = z and b = c = z

. As a
consequence,W (a, e) =W
?
b, e

?
andW (c, e) =W
?
d, e

?
are true by construction.
Using Neutrality, we get aRec ⇔ bRed, or equivalently, zRez
 ⇔ zRez (•). Because
of completeness of Re, we must have either zRez

(and also z

Rez via (•)) or zRez (and
also zRez

via (•)). Both cases, lead to zIez establishing Pareto Indifference.
2. If f satisfies Neutrality then f also satisfies Well-being Independence. Suppose the
antecedent of Well-being Independence is true, i.e., there exist two economies e =
(s,U) ,e

=
?
s,U

?
∈ E and two allocations z, z ∈ Z such that W (z, e) =W
?
z, e

?
and W
?
z

, e
?
= W
?
z

, e

?
. Simply choose a = b = z and c = d = z

such
that W (a, e) = W
?
b, e

?
and W (c, e) = W
?
d, e

?
holds. Using Neutrality, we get
aRec⇔ bRed, or equivalently, zRez
 ⇔ zRez

establishing Well-being Independence.
3. If f satisfies Pareto Indifference and Well-being Independence then f also satisfies
Neutrality. Suppose the antecedent of Neutrality holds, i.e., there exist two economies
e = (s,U) and e

=
?
s,U

?
∈ E and four allocations a,b, c,d ∈ Z such thatW (a, e) =
W
?
b, e

?
and W (c, e) = W
?
d, e

?
. Let us focus on an arbitrary individual i ∈ N .
BecauseWi (a, e) =Wi
?
b, e

?
, the indifference curve of Ui through ai and U

i through
bi are tangent to the same “shared resources” opportunity set defined by s. Given
Ui, U

i ∈ U , both indifference curves must cross at least once in R × [0, 1]. Choose a
bundle αi where both cross. Repeating this construction of αi for all individuals, we get
an allocation α ∈ Z such that W (α, e) =W (a, e) =W
?
b, e

?
=W
?
α, e
?
. In the
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same way, define an allocation β ∈ Z such that W (β, e) = W (c, e) = W
?
d, e

?
=
W
?
β, e
?
. Using Pareto Indifference and transitivity of Re and Re , we get:
(•) aRec⇔ αReβ and αReβ ⇔ bRed.
Using Well-being Independence, we get αReβ ⇔ αReβ. Together with (•), we get
aRec⇔ bRed, establishing Neutrality.
Second, we show that Neutrality is equivalent with welfarism, i.e., a rule f satisfies
Neutrality if and only if there exists a unique ordering R∗ defined over Rn, such that,
for each economy e ∈ E and for all allocations z, z ∈ Z we have zRez if and only if
W (z, e) R∗ W
?
z

, e
?
. Here welfarism has to be interpreted as follows: only well-being
levels (rather than utility levels) matter to rank two allocations (given a fixed size n of
the population and a fixed skill vector s). Welfarism is a well-known result in the social
choice literature (see Bossert and Weymark (2004), theorem 2, for a proof). It suffices
to notice that our set-up is sufficiently rich to obtain welfarism: for any two well-being
vectors v,w ∈ Rn, there exist two allocations z, z ∈ Z and an economy e ∈ E such that
W (z, e) = v andW
?
z

, e
?
= w.
Third, the unique ordering R∗ inherits certain properties from f : R∗ must satisfy weak
Pareto (if vi>wi for all i ∈ N , then vP ∗w) and Anonimity (vI∗π (v) with π : N → N a
permutation of individuals in N). This is straightforward. We prove that R∗ must also
satisfy
H?????? E?????: For all well-being vectors v,w ∈ Rn and for all individuals
i, j ∈ N : If (i) wi < vi < vj < wj and (ii) vk = wk for all k 9= i, j, then vR∗w.
?
?
0
c
c
???
???
????
?????
?
wi?
???
???
????
?????
?
vi?
???
???
????
?????
?
vj?
???
???
????
?????
?
wj?
ci = cj
c
?
i = c
?
j
c
?
i
ci
cj
c
?
j
?
?
?
?
Suppose the antecedent of Hammond Equity holds, or there exist two well-being vectors
v,w ∈ Rn and two individuals i, j ∈ N such that wi < vi < vj < wj and vk = wk for
all k 9= i, j hold. The figure illustrates how it is possible to construct bundles zi, zj and
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z

i, z

j and a utility function Ui = Uj ∈ U such that Wi (z, e) = vi, Wj (z, e) = vj and
Wi
?
z

, e
?
= wi, Wj
?
z

, e
?
= wj and the antecedents of the Compensation principle
are satisfied for i, j, i.e., (i) ci = cj , c

i = c

j and Ui = Uj (ii) ∃δ > 0 such that
c

i = ci + δ < cj − δ = c

j . The bundles zi, zj and z

i, z

j can be extended with bundles
zk = z

k for the other individuals k 9= i, j to obtain allocations z and z

, such that
Wk (z, e) = vk = wk =Wk
?
z

, e
?
holds for all k 9= i, j. Using Compensation, we must
have zRez

and thus, via welfarism, also vR∗w must hold.
Finally, Given the axioms for R∗, Tungodden (2000, theorem 1) shows that minv >
minw implies vP ∗w, for any vectors v,w ∈ Rn, which, given welfarism, completes our
proof.
Proof of propositions 2 and 3
To prove propositions 2 and 3, we need two “tricks” and two lemmas. We start with
the tricks.
Consider an implementable and feasible allocation x ∈X as in figure A1. The bundles
xLL and xHH lie somewhere in the left and right shaded zone, respectively, to satisfy
the incentive constraints. The bundle x◦ is constructed to satisfy VHL (x◦) = VHL (xHL)
and MRSYHL (x◦) = 1.
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Figure A1: the allocations x and x+ illustrating trick 1.
Now, consider the allocation x+∈X with x+st = xst for all types st 9= HL and x+HL is
constructed by moving xHL on his indifference curve towards the bundle x◦. It is clear
that the allocation x+ is implementable. Furthermore, given the preference technology
defined by U , we have y+HL− c+HL > y∗HL− c∗HL. Thus, the allocation x+ is also feasible,
with
?
st∈ST nst
?
y+st − c+st
?
−
?
st∈ST nst (y
∗
st − c∗st) = m > 0. The amount of money
m can now be freely redistributed to the net income of all types (while still satisfying
all incentive constraints) resulting in a weak Pareto improvement and thus also an
improvement according to the government’s program (∗). More generally, we obtain:
T???? 1: Consider an implementable and feasible allocation x ∈X and a type st
whose bundle xst can be moved along his indifference curve (i) without violating
incentive constraints and (ii) making an amount of moneym free for redistribution.
The allocation x cannot be optimal according to program (∗), because everyone
can be made strictly better-off (by redistributing the amount of money m to the
net incomes of all types), without violating incentive constraints.
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To illustrate the second trick, consider an implementable and feasible allocation x ∈X
as in figure A2.
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Figure A2: the allocation x and x+ illustrating trick 2.
Again, the bundle xHH lies somewhere in the right shaded zone to satisfy the incentive
constraints. Now it is possible to construct a feasible and implementable allocation
x+∈X , transferring in x some net income from type LL to the other types LH, HL
and HH. Whether or not the resulting allocation is better according to program (∗),
ultimately depends on the well-being levels in society: if LL is strictly better off com-
pared to one of the other types, it is always possible to find an allocation x+ which is
better according to program (∗). We summarize
T???? 2: Consider an implementable and feasible allocation x ∈X and one or
more types st whose bundle(s) xst can be moved downwards (i) without violating
incentive constraints and (ii) making an amount of money m > 0 free for redistrib-
ution to the other types. The allocation x cannot be optimal according to program
(∗), if all donor type(s) st were strictly better off in x compared to (one of) the
other types.
Besides two tricks, we need two lemmas. The first lemma tells us that the program (∗)
can, loosely speaking, focus on the lower-skilled, because they are always worse-off in
terms of well-being, more precisely:
Lemma 1. Consider two types with the same taste for working t ∈ T (and thus the same
utility function Ut ∈ U), but different skills 0 ≤ L < H. In an implementable allocation
x ∈X , with VHt (xHt) ≥ VHt (xLt) (resp. VHt (xHt) > VHt (xLt)) the lower-skilled type
Lt is always worse off (resp. strictly worse off) compared to the higher-skilled type Ht,
i.e.,WHt (x) ≥WLt (x) (resp.WHt (x) >WLt (x)).
Proof. Consider two types with the same taste for working t ∈ T . We prove the case
where skills satisfy 0 < L < T and VHt (xHt) ≥ VHt (xLt); the other cases are analogous.
Call (cLt, yLt) and (cHt, yHt) their bundles. Individuals with the same taste t have the
same utility functions Ut and thus also the same indifference curves and therefore the
same well-being level for bundles on the same indifference curve. Because our well-being
measure is ordinally equivalent with utility, measured by Ut, it suffices to show that
Ut
?
cLt,
yLt
L
?
≤ Ut
?
cHt,
yHt
H
?
. Suppose not, i.e., suppose (i) Ut
?
cLt,
yLt
L
?
> Ut
?
cHt,
yHt
H
?
.
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Because VHt (xHt) ≥ VHt (xLt) we get, by definition of VHt, that (ii) Ut
?
cHt,
yHt
H
?
≥
Ut
?
cLt,
yLt
H
?
. Combining (i) and (ii), we obtain Ut
?
cLt,
yLt
L
?
> Ut
?
cLt,
yLt
H
?
, a contra-
diction given Ut ∈ U and 0 < L < H. ?
Lemma 2 tells us that it cannot be optimal –according to the government’s program
(∗)– to treat the indistinguishable middle types LH and HL differently in case y∗HL ≤
L. Otherwise (if y∗HL > L) it might be optimal to treat them differently, but only under
certain conditions:
Lemma 2. Consider a four type economy with skills 0 < L < H and tastes represented
by utility functions UL, UH ∈ U , which satisfy single-crossingness and indistinguishable
middle type. Consider a government who optimizes the program defined by (∗). In an
optimal allocation x∗∈X , we must have:
(a). x∗LH = x
∗
HL, if y
∗
HL ≤ L, or else,
(b). VHL (x∗LH) = VHL (x
∗
HL) , with y
∗
LH = L < y
∗
HL and MRSYHL (x
∗
HL) ≤ 1.
Proof of part (a). Suppose y∗HL ≤ L and x∗LH 9= x∗HL. We show that it is always
possible to construct another allocation x ∈X , which is feasible, implementable and
strictly better than x∗ according to the government’s program (∗). Because y∗HL ≤ L,
the incentive compatibility constraints ICLH,HL and ICHL,LH require
VHL (x
∗
HL) ≥ VHL (x∗LH) and
VLH (x
∗
LH) ≥ VLH (x∗HL)⇔ VHL (x∗LH) ≥ VHL (x∗HL) ,
where the equivalence⇔ is due to indistinguishable middle types. We must have VHL (x∗HL) =
VHL (x
∗
LH), or x
∗
LH and x
∗
HL must lie on the same indifference curve.
Given our preference technology U , there are only two cases for x∗LH 9= x∗HL. Assume
x∗LH < x
∗
HL, i.e., c
∗
LH < c
∗
HL and y
∗
LH < y
∗
HL; for the other case x
∗
LH > x
∗
HL simply
switch subscripts HL and LH in the sequel. Define a bundle x◦ = (c◦, y◦) in R ×
[0, L] such that x◦ also lies on the same indifference curve through x∗LH and x
∗
HL, i.e.,
VHL (x
◦) = VHL (x∗HL), and choose (i) y
◦ = 0, ifMRSYHL ≥ 1 everywhere in R× [0, L],
(ii) y◦ = L, if MRSYHL ≤ 1 everywhere in R× [0, L], or else (iii) choose x◦ such that
MRSYHL (x
◦) = 1. Each case leads to any of the following three cases: either (α)
y◦ ≤ y∗LH < y∗HL, or (β) y∗LH < y◦ < y∗HL or (γ) y∗LH < y∗HL ≤ y◦. In each of the
three cases (α), (β) and (γ), it is possible to use ????? 1, by moving either x∗HL to the
left on his indifference curve (in case (α) and (β)) or moving x∗LH to the right on his
indifference curve (in case (γ)), contradicting that x∗ was optimal.
Proof of part (b). Suppose y∗HL > L. We show that x
∗
LH < x
∗
HL, with y
∗
LH = L and
MRSYHL (x
∗
HL) ≤ 1, must hold. Recall that, in case y∗HL > L, the incentive constraint
ICLH,HL does not exist, because type HL’s bundle is not attainable for LH.
We first show that the incentive constraint ICHL,LH must bind, i.e., VHL (x∗HL) =
VHL (x
∗
LH). Suppose not, i.e., VHL (x
∗
HL) > VHL (x
∗
LH). Single-crossingness ensures
that VHL (x∗HL) > VHL (x
∗
LL) and thus LL is strictly worse-off compared to HL (lemma
1); for the same reason, LH is strictly worse off compared to HH. Now, it is possible to
use ????? 2, transferring from typeHL (and possibly HH as well, if ICHL,HH binds) to
both other types LL and LH, which must improve the lowest well-being, contradicting
that x∗ was optimal according to program (∗).
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Now, we are back in the same situation as in part (a), because both x∗LH and x
∗
HL,
with x∗LH < x
∗
HL, lie on the same indifference curve (of type HL), i.e., VHL (x
∗
LH) =
VHL (x
∗
HL), but here y
∗
LH ≤ L < y∗HL. Now proceed as in part (a). Define the bundle
x◦ = (c◦, y◦) in R× [0,H] such that x◦ also lies on the same indifference curve through
x∗LH and x
∗
HL, i.e., VHL (x
◦) = VHL (x∗HL), and choose (i) y
◦ = 0, if MRSYHL ≥ 1
everywhere in R × [0,H], (ii) y◦ = H, if MRSYHL ≤ 1 everywhere in R × [0,H],
or else (iii) choose x◦ such that MRSYHL (x◦) = 1. Now, y◦ < y∗HL is not possible
(otherwise we can use ????? 1, moving x∗HL to the left on his indifference curve); thus
MRSYHL (x
∗
HL) ≤ 1. As a consequence y◦ ≥ y∗HL must hold. Now, y∗LH < L is not
possible (because then y∗LH < L < y
◦ and using trick 1 again, we could move x∗LH to
the right on his indifference curve). Thus y∗LH = L, which completes the proof. ?
We are ready to prove propositions 2 and 3, on the basis of lemmas 1 and 2 and tricks
1 and 2.
Proof of proposition 2
Consider a four type economy with skills 0 < L < H and tastes represented by utility
functions UL, UH ∈ U , which satisfy single-crossingness and indistinguishable middle
type. Consider a government who optimizes the program defined by (∗). In an optimal
allocation x∗ ∈ X , we must have y∗LL − c∗LL ≥ y∗LH − c∗LH .
Our proof consists of two parts, depending on whether (a) y∗HL ≤ L in the optimum x∗,
or (b) y∗HL > L. Given the definition of X , one of both cases must hold. We show, for
both cases, that y∗LL − c∗LL < y∗LH − c∗LH is not possible.
Proof of part (a). Suppose y∗HL ≤ L (thus x∗LH = x∗HL via lemma 2) and y∗LL −
c∗LL < y
∗
LH − c∗LH . We consider four possible cases, depending on whether ICLL,LH
and/or ICLH,LL bind, or not. In an optimum x∗ of the program (∗), one of these four
cases must hold. For all cases, we show that it is possible to construct a strictly better
allocation according to the program (∗), which also satisfies the feasibility and incentive
compatibility constraints.
1. ICLL,LH and ICLH,LL bind. This requires x∗LL = x
∗
LH which contradicts y
∗
LL−c∗LL <
y∗LH − c∗LH .
2. ICLL,LH binds, ICLH,LL does not bind. 2a. If MRSYLL (x∗LL) < 1, we could use
????? 1 moving x∗LL somewhat to the right on his indifference curve. 2b. We must
have MRSYLL (x∗LL) ≥ 1, from (2a). But, given the preference technology defined by
U , y∗LL − c∗LL < y∗LH − c∗LH is not possible, a contradiction.
3. ICLL,LH does not bind, ICLH,LL binds: 3a. Let us first focus on type LH. If
y∗LH = 0, then incentive constraints and single-crossingness require x
∗
LL = x
∗
LH , which
violates y∗LL−c∗LL < y∗LH−c∗LH . So y∗LH > 0. IfMRSYLH (x∗LH) > 1, we can use ?????
1 again, by moving both x∗LH = x
∗
HL to the left on their (common) indifference curve.
SoMRSYLH (x∗LH) ≤ 1 must hold. 3b. We focus now on type LL. We must have either
(i) y∗LL = 0 or (ii) y
∗
LL > 0. In case (ii), we have MRSYLH (x
∗
LH) ≤ 1 (otherwise we can
use ????? 1, moving x∗LH somewhat to the left on his indifference curve). 3c. Due to
lemma 1, either type LH or LL has the minimal well-being. Figure A3 illustrates (3a),
(3b(ii)) and y∗LL − c∗LL < y∗LH − c∗LH ; type HH’s bundle is somewhere in the shaded
zone. It is easy to verify that type LH is always strictly worse-off compared to type
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LL, irrespective of the proportion of high-skilled nHL+nHHn (which defines the kink in
the budget set where the slope changes from HL > 1 to 1) and irrespective of whether
(3b(i)) or (3b(ii)) applies.
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Figure A3: type LL is strictly better off compared to type LH .
Since ICLL,LH does not bind, it is always possible to use ????? 2 transferring a small
amount of money from LL to the other types LH, HL and HH, improving the minimal
well-being in society, a contradiction.
4. ICLL,LH and ICLH,LL do not bind. Using ????? 1, it can be verified that only the fol-
lowing cases are possible: (i) y∗LL = 0 < y
∗
LH ,MRSYLL (x
∗
LL) ≥ 1 andMRSYLH (x∗LH) ≤
1, or (ii) 0 < y∗LL < y
∗
LH , MRSYLL (x
∗
LL) = 1 andMRSYLH (x
∗
LH) ≤ 1. We are back in
the same situation as in (3). In both cases (i) and (ii) and, given y∗LL−c∗LL < y∗LH−c∗LH ,
type LH is strictly worse-off compared to LL, irrespective of the proportion of high-
skilled. Here again, ????? 2 can be used to obtain a contradiction.
Proof of part (b). Suppose y∗HL > L (thus VHL (x
∗
LH) = VHL (x
∗
HL), with y
∗
LH = L <
y∗HL and MRSYHL (x
∗
HL) ≤ 1 via lemma 2) and y∗LL − c∗LL < y∗LH − c∗LH . It is again
possible to consider four cases, depending on whether ICLL,LH and/or ICLH,LL bind
or not, and to show, for each case, a contradiction. Actually, the proof is completely
analogous as in steps 1-4 of part (a) and therefore omitted.
Proof of proposition 3
Consider a four type economy with skills L = 0 < H and tastes represented by utility
functions UL, UH ∈ U , which satisfy single-crossingness and indistinguishable middle
type. Consider a government who optimizes the program defined by (∗). In an optimal
allocation x∗ ∈ X we must have y∗LL − c∗LL = y∗LH − c∗LH ≤ y∗HL − c∗HL.
Proof. Suppose y∗LL − c∗LL = y∗LH − c∗LH > y∗HL − c∗HL holds. 1. Because L = 0
and x∗ ∈ X , we must have y∗LL = y∗LH = 0 and, given the incentive constraints, also
c∗LL = c
∗
LH must hold. 2. Due to lemma 1, the lowest well-being is either LH or LL,
thus, given (1), we must maximize the basic income, i.e., maximize c∗LL = c
∗
LH . 3.
y∗HL = 0 is excluded, otherwise we must have c
∗
LH = c
∗
HL (due to incentive constraints)
and y∗LH − c∗LH > y∗HL − c∗HL would be violated. 4. So, y∗HL > 0 holds from (3). Now,
x∗LH and x
∗
HL must lie on the same indifference curve, or VHL (x
∗
HL) = VHL (x
∗
LH).
Otherwise (see the proof of lemma 2, part (b)) it would be possible to improve the
situation of the worst-off types LL and LH, at the cost of the better-off types HL and
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HH (on the basis of ????? 2). 5. IfMRSYHL (x∗HL) > 1 at y∗HL > 0, we can use ?????
1, moving x∗HL to the left on his indifference curve. 6. To summarize, we must have
MRSYHL (x
∗
HL) ≤ 1 and y∗HL > 0 while VHL (x∗HL) = VHL (x∗LH) and y∗LH = 0. But
this contradicts y∗LH − c∗LH > y∗HL− c∗HL, given our preference technology defined by U .
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Appendix B: The Belgian tax system for singles
pre-tax income y marginal tax rate (in %)
< 5032 0
5033 — 6272 25
6273 — 8304 30
8305 — 1849 40
11850 — 27268 45
27269 — 40902 50
40903 — 59990 52.5
> 59990 55
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Appendix C: Imputation via a sample selection model
First, we present the variables used for imputing gross hourly wages σ and net hourly
benefits bh; afterwards, we show the estimates for both sample selection models.
Imputing gross hourly wages σ
In the wage equation, the independent variables are:
• age and its square (age, agesq)
• educational dummies indicating the highest achieved education level of the in-
dividual, starting from primary education (base case), lower secondary education
(dumeduc2 ), higher secondary education (dumeduc3 ), higher education short type
(dumeduc4 ), higher education long type (dumeduc5 )
• a gender dummy (sex) taking the value of 1 for females
In the selection equation, the independent variables are:
• physical health dummies indicating the general health situation of the individual,
ranging from very good (base case), good (dumhealth2 ), reasonable (dumhealth3 ),
to bad (dumhealth4 )
• mental health dummies indicating how often the individual feels depressed, rang-
ing from never (base case), seldom (dumdepri2 ), at times (dumdepri3 ), regularly
(dumdepri4 ), to frequently (dumdepri5 ); and how often the individual longs for
death, ranging from never (base case), seldom (dumdeath2 ), at times (dumdeath3 ),
regularly (dumdeath4 ), to frequently (dumdeath5 )
• smoking dummies indicating smoking behaviour, ranging from never (base case),
occasionally (dumsmoke2 ), to daily (dumsmoke3 )
• care dummies indicating whether the individual has to take care for his children
(child) taking the value of 1 if affirmative; and/or has to take care of others
(depperson) taking the value of 1 if affirmative
• the independent variables of the wage equation
Imputing net hourly benefits bh
The dependent variable is the marginal benefit per hour bh = b2925 , with b the net yearly
benefit. The independent variables are identical to those in the Heckman selection
model imputing σ. In addition, we add in both the benefit and the selection equation
civil status dummies, indicating whether the individual is divorced (divorce), taking the
value of 1 if affirmative; widowed (widow), taking the value of 1 if affirmative; living
together (cohabit), taking the value of 1 if affirmative.
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Number of observations = 644, from which 136 censored and 508
uncensored. Wald’s χ2 (7) = 265.68 with Pr > χ2 (7) = 0.00 and
likelihood ratio test of independent wage and selection equations
results in χ2 (1) = 4.66 with Pr > χ2 (1) = 0.031.
wage equation Coefficient Standard Error Pr > |z|
age
agesq
dumeduc2
dumeduc3
dumeduc4
dumeduc5
sex
cons
0.497 0.123 0.000
-0.003 0.002 0.075
1.364 1.141 0.232
2.834 1.103 0.010
4.508 1.160 0.000
5.617 1.149 0.000
-0.917 0.383 0.017
-2.680 2.568 0.297
selection equation Coefficient Standard Error Pr > |z|
dumhealth2
dumhealth3
dumhealth4
dumdepri2
dumdepri3
dumdepri4
dumdepri5
dumdeath2
dumdeath3
dumdeath4
dumdeath5
dumsmoke2
dumsmoke3
child
depperson
age
agesq
dumeduc2
dumeduc3
dumeduc4
dumeduc5
sex
cons
-0.576 0.176 0.001
-0.686 0.227 0.002
-1.221 0.476 0.010
0.014 0.186 0.938
-0.243 0.185 0.188
-0.486 0.249 0.051
-0.799 0.342 0.019
0.374 0.173 0.031
0.113 0.196 0.563
0.160 0.297 0.591
-0.657 0.352 0.062
-0.041 0.245 0.868
-0.219 0.138 0.114
-0.355 0.153 0.020
-0.232 0.210 0.269
0.179 0.040 0.000
-0.002 0.001 0.000
0.587 0.254 0.021
0.784 0.243 0.001
1.584 0.305 0.000
1.685 0.291 0.000
-0.507 0.139 0.000
-2.016 0.728 0.006
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Number of observations = 638, from which 480 censored and 158
uncensored. Wald’s χ2 (10) = 50.51 with Pr > χ2 (7) = 0.00 and
likelihood ratio test of independent benefit and selection equations
results in χ2 (1) = 7.09 with Pr > χ2 (1) = 0.008.
benefit equation Coefficient Standard Error Pr > |z|
age
agesq
dumeduc2
dumeduc3
dumeduc4
dumeduc5
sex
divorce
widow
cohabit
cons
0.115 0.051 0.025
-0.001 0.001 0.120
0.361 0.259 0.163
0.470 0.271 0.083
0.181 0.358 0.613
0.575 0.410 0.161
-0.317 0.187 0.091
0.376 0.197 0.057
-0.504 0.582 0.386
-0.035 0.196 0.858
-0.226 0.921 0.806
selection equation Coefficient Standard Error Pr > |z|
dumhealth2
dumhealth3
dumhealth4
dumdepri2
dumdepri3
dumdepri4
dumdepri5
dumdeath2
dumdeath3
dumdeath4
dumdeath5
dumsmoke2
dumsmoke3
child
depperson
age
agesq
dumeduc2
dumeduc3
dumeduc4
dumeduc5
sex
divorce
widow
cohabit
cons
0.304 0.154 0.048
0.416 0.203 0.040
0.384 0.415 0.355
0.137 0.163 0.400
0.244 0.166 0.142
0.470 0.237 0.048
0.334 0.329 0.311
-0.464 0.154 0.003
0.020 0.173 0.909
0.369 0.254 0.145
0.889 0.339 0.009
0.114 0.214 0.596
0.228 0.124 0.065
0.304 0.143 0.033
0.158 0.192 0.410
-0.108 0.040 0.007
0.001 0.001 0.006
-0.376 0.242 0.120
-0.707 0.232 0.002
-1.049 0.265 0.000
-1.428 0.270 0.000
0.373 0.128 0.004
0.027 0.162 0.868
0.036 0.490 0.941
-0.329 0.144 0.022
1.247 0.717 0.082
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Appendix D: Some descriptive statistics
We report the number of observations (n), the minimum (min), the 25th percentile
(p25), the median (p50), the 75th percentile (p75) and the maximum (max) for the
following variables: age, normalized labour c, observed gross hourly wages σ, imputed
gross hourly wages σˆ, observed and imputed gross hourly wages (σ, σˆ), observed net
hourly benefits bh, imputed net hourly benefits bˆh and observed and imputed net hourly
benefits (bh, bˆh).
n min p25 p50 p75 max
age 621 16 25 33 42 70
c 621 0.000 0.231 0.554 0.615 1.000
σ 502 1.495 9.585 11.864 15.700 38.271
σˆ 119 1.262 4.796 6.665 9.421 19.214
σ, σˆ 621 1.262 8.594 11.065 14.404 38.271
bh 143 0.166 0.915 1.849 3.051 3.661
bˆh 478 0.002 0.072 0.214 0.510 2.089
bh, bˆh 621 0.002 0.115 0.345 0.928 3.661
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